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ARTICLES
I n Defense of Speciesism

The concept of a right to life has
received a great deal of attention
recently, chiefly because it figures so
prominently in many arguments con~
cerning a wide variety of moral
issues.
Arguments concerning the
morality of abortion, capital punish
ment, infanticide, famine relief, and
animal consumption and experimenta
tion, for instance, frequently invoke
th is con cept, so cia rity about it is of
fundamental philosophical and practical
importance.
For philosophers, one of the pri
mary tasks is to determine the legiti
mate grounds for its ascription. Moral
persons 1 , that is, beings who by def
inition
have rights
(and
perhaps
duties), definitely have this right,
since it is a basic one. So if neces
sarily all and only commonsense per
sons 2-that is, persons defi ned pu rely
descriptively and, presumably, solely
in terms of mental capacities-a re moral
persons 3 , and if (necessarily?) all and
only moral persons have a right to
life, then (necessarily?) all and only
commonsense persons have a right to
life.
Since commonsense persons are
defined non-morally and non-biologi
cally, it follows that it is possible that
some nonhumans have a right to life,
and possible that some humans lack
this right.
But the latter, it would
seem, is not just a possibility but an
actuality: even if the requ isite mental
capacities are quite elementa ry ,
a
human being who is a fetus or a
young infant,· or who is seriously
retarded, extremely and permanently
insane, very senile, permanently cog
nitively impaired 4 , in a deep and
irreversible coma, or irreparably and
acutely
brain
damaged
is
not
a

commonsense person, and so would not
have a right to life. Similarly, many
if not all nonhuman animals are not
commonsense persons, so they, too,
do not possess a right to life. To be
sure, this does not mean that taking
the life of such a creature, whether
human or nonhuman, is morally per
missible, for there may well be other,
and weighty, reasons why such killing
shou Id be prohibited.
But it does
mean that to kill such a creature is
not to violate a right to life that that
creature possesses. Grounds for rul
ing out such killing, if they exist at
all, would have to be found else
where.
Exactly how many humans and how
many animals, if any, have a right to
life will depend, on this view, on how
high the standards for commonsense
personhood are set.
Joel Feinberg's
standards,
which
are
moderate,S
exclude all fetuses and, apparently,
all young infants; 6
Peter Singer's
standards, which, it would seem, are
quite low, include a fair portion of
the animal ki ngdom. 7
Rega rd less of
what the standards should be, how
ever, merely being a live member of
ou r own species, Homo sapiens, con
stitutes no valid ground for the
ascription of a right to life. To think
that it does would be to be guilty of
speciesism.
Speciesism, according to Singer, is
"prefer[ring].
members of our
own species, simply because they are
members of ou r species. "8
Such
preference is, I shall assume, moral
preference, and includes the ascrip
tion of a right to life. 9
I take the
following, then, to be, on Singer's
view, a sufficient condition for a per
son,
A,
to be a speciesist:
A
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ascribes a right to life to X, a live
member of his/her own species who
fails to qualify for commonsense per
sonhood, but A refuses to ascribe a
right to life to Y, a live member of
another species who fails to qualify
for commonsen se person hood but is
otherwise similar to X.
Although Joel Feinberg does not
mention speciesism per se, he appears
to think that some form of speciesism
'Iurks behind what he calls the Modi
fied Species Criterion.
The Modified
Species Criterion is the view that "All
and only [live] members of species
characterized by C [where C is the
set of characteristics individually nec
essary and jointly sufficient for com
monsense personhood], whether the
species is Homo sapiens or another,
and whether or not the individual in
question happen s to possess C, are
moral persons entitled to full and
equal protection by the moral ru Ie
against homicide, "10
i. e. ,
have a
right to life (as the context makes
evident).
Like
Singer,
Feinberg
rejects speciesism, at least as far as
the above principle is concerned:
Why is a permanently uncon
scious but living body of a
human or an extragalactic per
son . . . a moral person when
it lacks as an individual the
characteristics that determine
moral personhood? 11
Apparently the question here is
-rhetorical:
Feinberg thinks there is
no reason; or, in other words, that
possession of the property of being a
Iive member of a species generally
characterized by moral personhood is
not a sufficient condition for the
ascription of a right to life.
A view
to the effect that possession of such a
property is sufficient is sl ightly dif
ferent from, but importantly similar
to, the va riety of speciesism identified
above.
For both make membership in
species of
some
moral
a certain

weig ht.
I n the case of the doctri ne
Singer is concerned with, what this
amounts to is:
(SS)
(Singer's
version
of
Speciesism) A live creature's
belonging to our own species
(which, for readers of this
paper, is Homo sapiens) is of
some
moral
weight,
and
enough, in fact, for us to
ascribe a right to life to that
creatu re.
And the view Feinberg has focused on
is:
(FS)
(Feinberg's version of
Speciesism) A live creature's
belong to a species, not neces
sarily our own, which is gen
erally characterized by person
hood, is of some moral weight,
and enough, in fact, to ascribe
a right to life to that creature.
Feinberg and Singer are not alone
in thin ki ng (SS) and (FS) false-many
philosophers think the same. 12 How
ever, in what follows I shall argue for
(SS), argue for (FS), raise and reply
to a number of objections, and then
bdefly note some important conse
quences of my view and some impor
tant caveats that should be issued
with it.
II
Two things need to be said before
I present my argument for (SS).
Fi rst, my a rgument, like every other
argument,
relies on a number of
assumptions.
Some of these assum'p
tions will be explicitly indicated below
and as the argument proceeds.
Sec
ond, in order to facilitate understand
ing, three crucial cases covered by
(5S) will be briefly described.
My
hope is that the cases, besides being
illustrative of the scope of (55), will
add some flesh to the bare bones of
argument-and will inject a healthy
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dose of reality into what might other
wise
seem
a
rather
high-level,
abstract, and "distant" set of consid
erations.
Two assumptions, then:
(1) the
"our own" and "us" of (SS) will be
temporarily assumed to refer to Homo
sapiens.
This assumption I will later
discharge.
(2) All persons will be
assumed to be members of some biolo
gical species. This assumption I will
not discharge, though i believe it
could be.
With these assumptions in mind, let
me present th ree cases.
Case One. Suppose a close friend
offers you a ride home from work one
day, but because you have a great
deal of work to do, you decline his
offer. On the way home his car has
an
unexpected
mechanical
failure
resulting in a bad accident.
Your
friend is severely brain damaged,. and
is no longer a commonsense person on
even the most liberal criteria of com
monsense personhood.
He is con
scious, but you find it hard to meet
his eyes during your hospital visits.
Case Two.
Imagine that you are
an eighteen-year-old woman who has
always thought of herself as an only
child. Today your mother thinks you
are at last ready for the truth. She
tells you that you have a twin brother
who is still alive, a twin brother that
is severely Mongoloid.
Du ri ng the
next week you visit him at the insti
tution where he is kept.
You don't
know exactly what your feelings and
thoughts are-he seems so far from you
yet so near, too.
Case Three.
It has taken years,
let us suppose, but you are now a
licensed psychiatrist, with a first job
at a state mental institution.
The
th i rd day on the job you meet Walter
Weber, a patient who, behaviorally
and mentally, is indistinguishable from
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a dog.
But there is
something
vaguely familiar about him, though
you can't quite place it at first.
Then you remember.
Twenty yea rs
ago, when you were a child, Walter
Weber lived down the street from you.
He was not a close friend of yours,
and you didn't know him very well,
but there was no indication that he
wou Id ever end up as a hopeless case
in a state institution.
On the way
home from work that day you reflect
on yourself and the many 'are's and
'could have been's that separate you
from your patients.
My argument for (SS) is based
partly on some metaphysical or quasi
metaphysical propositions, partly on
some contingent but very pervasive,
well established, and important facts
about what I'll call the empirical pre
conditions of human personhood, and
pa rtly on what seem to me to be
acceptable moral principles.
First,
metaphysics.
Every person you and I know iSi a
human being.
(Or at least every
person who is indisputably such is a
human being.
Purported cases of
acquaintance with nonhuman persons,
such as animal persons [chimpanzees,
porpoises, dolphins, and so on] and
spiritual persons [deities, the Deity,
dead relatives,
or the like], are
i nteresti ng
and
important,
and
deserving of detailed critical atten
tion.
However, the proper place for
such attention is elsewhere; a critical
investigation of such phenomena is not
possible here.) And even if it is not
a necessary truth that human persons
a re one and the same entities as
human bodies-a position that has had
a number of eminent defenders-· per
sonal identity seems to be closely tied
to bodily identity, with the latter
seeming to be either a necessary con
dition for theformer 13 or criteriologi
cally related to the former.
Bodily
identity and person identity are "cri
teriologically related," to use the
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expression in Shoemaker's sense,14
only if it is a necessary truth that
bodily identity is evidence for per
sonal identity.
Such a criterion,
however, really expresses a condition
for re- identifyi ng, rather tha n for
identifying, persons, and it is the
identification of persons wh ich is of
paramount importance in the moral
context as far as the ascription of
basic rights is concerned.
Still, the
principle is not without interest or
importance, for one of its near rela
tives,
(IP)
It's a necessary truth
that the statement 'X is alive
human being' is good evidence
for the statement 'x is a
human person,'
does concern the identification of per
sons, and so is relevant in the pres
ent context.
If, then, (I P) or any of.
the above mentioned views concern i ng
the relation of persons and human
beings is correct, or if some (perhaps
weaker) variant on one or more of
them is correct, then something of
moral importance has, I think, been
established. For it would seem, first,
that there is at least a quasi-meta
physical linkage between the concepts
of a person and a human being, and
second, that ou r abi Iity to identify
with human non-persons in a way that
we seem not able to identify with sen
tient and intelligent nonhuman non
persons thus has a solid metaphysical
basis.
And it would therefore also
seem, though this must be taken with
caution, that there is an intimate con
nection between basic rights, such as
a right to life, and humanity, here
taken biologically.
This, of course,
is not to establish that there is a
linkage enough to support the flow,
so to speak, of basic rights into
human beings per se; but it is to say
that the metaphysical gridwork which
supports the flow to persons has a
stru ctu re wh ich,
in
some sen se,
includes human beings.

I can well imagine the following
objection being raised at this point,
however.
"Even conceding this highly
metaphorical business about a
metaphysical
gridwork,
why
should basic rights be attrib
uted to human non-persons?
That's what (S5) requires, but
it is the pt'operty of being a
person, and that alone, which
generates basic rights.
So
even if the concept of a person
is 'caught up with' that of a
human being, that is not to
the point at all.
Personhood,
not humanhood, is the basis,
and the sole basis, for the
ascription of basic rights. 11
This objection seems strong, but I
don't find it unsettling.
In brief, I
th ink that it would hold (,) on Iy if
ou r concept of person hood were much
different than it is, only in a world
very different from the one we have
(for in our world our initial and per
haps only purchase on the concept of
personhood is by way of the human
form-a point which is a leitmotif in the
ph ilosophy of the later Wittgenstein,
and is sketched, to some small extent,
above), and (2) only in a world much
better than the one we have, only in
a world in which the contingent facts
surrounding
human
personhood
needn't be taken into account.
Let
me explain this second point, espe
cially.
A human being can function as a
person only if he has adequate food,
water, shelter, air, an intact and
properly functioning brain, and the
time,
ability,
and
opportunity to
acquire knowledge and develop his
intellectual capacities and moral sensi
bilities.
These
conditions,
among
others, are what I shall call the
empirical preconditions for human per
sonhood (EPHP). If they weren't sat
isfied, human persons, as we know
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them, would not exist.
In circum
stances vastly different from those we
encounter in this world, the limita
tions on human personal existence
represented by (EPHP) would not
have to be ta ken into con sideration by
persons. But in our world, they are
at least as obvious, pervasive, and
important features of our existence as
the sun, and, barring any radical
changes in our ability to transform
ou rselves and ou r envi ronment, they
are here to stay.
Because they are
located at the center stage of ou r
existence, they seem to me to be just
the sort of thing which any adequate,
realistic morality needs to take into
accou nt.
There is one other empi rical fact
which circumscribes the existence of
human persons which should also be
noted in this context.
This fact is,
u nfortu nately , ha rd to identify with
anything like precision.
An existen
tialist label for it might be Radical
Conti ngency, but a somewhat less
dramatic title is Natural Contingency.
We are, everyone one of us reading
this paper, Fortune's Favored, at
least to a very great extent. We are
all persons-that's assured-and we are
all lucky enough to be living in rela
tively prosperous and safe times and
to have the intelligence, knowledge,
and leisure to read and understand
articles in learned journals. But the
first point is the important one as far
as basic rights a re concerned.
We
are all persons.
Not so our brain
damaged friend, or our Mongoloid twin
brother, or ou r former neighbor who
is mentally though not physically a
dog. What separates us from them is
what I have called the empirical pre
conditions for human personhood-that
and Natu ral Conti ngency, the fact
that 'the breaks' don't favor every
single human being, that to a large
extent each of us simply finds himself
in a particular position in the world,
that chance, contingency, luck, the
laws
of
nature
concerning
the
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development of persons all play a
large
role
in
determing
whether
(EPHP) are satisfied in any particular
case. If they are satisfied, the bene
ficiaries can take no credit for having
seen to it that they were; that wasn't
their doing. And if they are not sat
isfied, the victims deserve no blame;
that also was not their doing.
The
latter,
the victims,
are Fortune's
Fools, or, in the case of the infant
and the fetus, Fortune's Not Yet
Favored (if they a re lucky).
My a nswer to the objection, then,
that basic rights may well depend
on person hood simpliciter ina world
in which the' notion of a person were
easily separable from that of a human
being,
and
in
which
personhood
wasn't bou nd by biological, social,
physical, and psychological factors, or
by the vulnerabilities to which human
flesh and mind are subject, or by the
real threats to existence which we all
face, th reats posed by conditions over
which we have little or no control-in
short, by the laws of natu re and the
particular
facts
about
particular
human beings and their circumstances
which, in a very real sense, we are
simply saddled with.
I n a world of
that sort, one in which such things
didn't have to be taken into consider
ation, basic rights would be derivable
from personhood and from nothing
more.
In our world, however, such
basic (quasi- )metaphysical and inelimi
nable empirical factors are so familiar
and so woven into the very texture of
ou r lives that, perhaps paradoxically,
we moral theorists may need to divert
ou r attention from the abstractions
which we have been so successful at
teach i ng ou rselves to
notice-person
hood, autonomy, interests, the value
of life, etc.-and to make a special
effort in order to see that they, the
patent "bou nda ry" factors, conceptual
and empirical, are there at all. If the
notion of basic rights is to be usefully
employed in the world we have, it
seems to me that just the sort of
IS
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factors noted above have to be ta ken
into accou nt.
But to say this is not enough.
The skeptic may return at this point
to object that the argument goes no
distance toward showing what sort of
beings
shou Id
be
ascribed
basic
rights, but only that whatever beings
are ascribed basic rights, the facts
mentioned above have to be ta ken into
consideration.
Basic
rights,
the
argument would continue, are, what
ever their
content,
special,
non
world-bound possessions, possessions
wh ich if had by someone, a re had by
him in every possible world. But the
content of such rights may well be
world-dependent, as personal life, for
instance, may take vastly different
forms, i. e., have vastly different
(quasi- )metaphysical criteria and be
subject to vastly different empi rical
preconditions and natural contingen
cies, in different worlds.
Moreover,
to take quasi-metaphysical connec
tions, (EPHP), and Natural Contin
gency into account in ascribing basic
rights is to open the door to the pos
sibility of frogs, fish, and fleas as
rights possessors-certainly an unto
ward consequence.
From this it can
be
seen that
existence
precedes
essence, as far as basic rights are
concerned:
determining who poss
esses basic rights is and must be log
ically prior to determining what the
content of such rig hts are.

52
but a recog n ition of oneself
and what one was (a fetus, a
child) or could be (brain-dam
aged,
comatose,
retarded,
etc. )-has metaphysical or qua
si-metaphysical
underpinnings
of the sort described above.
(2) The existence of human
persons is constrained by laws
of nature and by particular
empirical facts of existence,
e.g., that there is not enough
protein in a given child's diet
for his brain to develop prop
erly.
There is Iittle to noth
ing that individual human ben
eficia ries or victims can do
about this, so far as their own
case is concerned.
(3) Chance occurrences, many
of them unforeseen, to which
all Homo sapiens are subject,
may well prevent a human from
becoming
a
person
(e.g.,
genetically linked retardation)
or rob a person of h is person
hood (e.g., senility).
Again,
it is not within our power to
make ourselves invulnerable to
such contingencies, or, in most
cases, to foresee them with
any great accuracy, or to pre
vent them from occu rring.

To respond to this charge, I would
like to present the main outline of my
entire argument in brief form.
An
explanation of its last major premise
will, I hope, constitute an adequate
reply.

(4) Human non-persons, then,
should
be
ascribed
basic
rights; for although in the
primary case it is persons who
are
ascribed
basic
rights,
equality of opportunity, or,
better, fairness, requires us
to ascribe basic
rights to
human non-persons as well.

(1) The concepts of a human
being and a person are not
related merely empirically, and
human persons can and do
identify with human non-per
sons. This identification-which
is not sympathy or compassion

If this argument is successful-and
its
last p remi se
(that concern i ng
equality and fairness in (4)), has not
yet been explained or defended-it
shows that all human beings have a
right to life, and it does so, in part,
by applying a principle of equality to

53

human non-persons.
How exactly is
the
principle
applied,
and
why
wouldn't the argument, if successful,
also show that, say, dogs who have
the mental capacity of infants also
have a right to life?
Part of the answer here lies in the
'logic' of the principle of equality: it
applies, in any given case, only to a
restricted class of things. What the
principle of equality is applied in
respect to, e.g., the right to have a
decent education, determi nes the rele
vant class covered by the principle;
e. g., a snail has no right to a decent
education and need not be accorded
the same opportu n ity to have a decent
education as normal human offspring.
It is, it seems to me, the history and
possibility of (natural) kind instances
which determines the scope of the
principle when basic rights are in
question.
And it also seems to me
that, in regard to basic rights, human
non - person's are in the same class as
human persons.
They and not dogs
are in the same class that we are
because they are in the same existen
tial boat:
besides the conceptual
linkage repeatedly emphasized above,
there are the important facts that we
identify with them, realize that we
could be (or once were) them, and
they could be (and perhaps someday
will be) us; that they are subject to
the same unforeseeable (or at least
unpreventable)
unfortunate
vicissi
tudes of fortune, in respect to per
sonhood, that we are; that given the
opportunity (a fair chance), they will
(normally) develop into persons, just
as we did, or they would remain per
sons, if foul fortune didn't intervene,
just as we in fact do.
Basically,
these are the points noted in (1)-(3).
All apply only to human beings, at
least so fa r as we cu rrently know.
If, then, all human beings are our
fellow travellers (even if it is also
true, as Cora Diamond says, that
nonhuman
animals
are
our fellow
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creatures 16 ) , then all have a right to
life.
For those (live) human beings
who are not persons are not persons
just because-and it is this 'just
because' among other things, that
distinguishes Homo sapiens from other
species-they were den ied the opportu
nity to become or to remain persons.
Their not being persons is no fault of
their own but the result of having 47
ch romosomes
(the
Mongoloid
twi n
brother), or of being involved in a
car
accident
(the
brain-damaged
friend), or of having organic or envi
ronmentally- induced
sch izoph ren ia
(Wa Iter Weber), or of any n umber of
causes. To spea k anth ropomorph ically
for a moment, given this inequity,
given that the laws of natu re and
Natu ral
Contingency
deprive some
humans of personhood, basic morality,
perhaps natural law, ensures at least
the minimum of fairness here, and
redresses the moral balance, makes up
for nature's inhumanity to humanity,
by according basic rights.
(While
nature may display inhumanity to
caninity, even caninity as a whole,
such inhumanity is not-in fact is ne
ver-vis-a-vis personhood [the central
though, if I am correct, not the only
ground for the ascription of basic
rights].
Both our concepts and our
empi rical theories and laws attest to
such a fact.)
The reach of basic
rights, then, exceeds the grasp of
personhood, and that because we live
in the world,
and the decidedly
imperfect world, that we do.
I hope
that is sufficient to show why Natural
Contingency and (EPHP) not only help
determine the content of basic rights
but also who should be accorded
them.
I would now like to discharge my
assumption that the "ou r own" and
"us" of (55) refer to human beings.
If the above argument is acceptable,
and if, as I have assumed, all persons
belong to some biological species, then
the same argument would seem to
apply, mutatis mutandis, to whatever
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species were picked out by "our own"
and "us." H. G. Wells's Martians, for
example, were persons who were not
Homo sapiens, but, as the novel
makes abundantly clear, they, too,
were subject to a range of biological
vu Inerabil ities and natu ral conti ngen
cies quite similar to the ones we are.
And so it wou Id be with every spec
ies, it seems to me.

Kantian dictum to transform moral laws
into natural laws (that is, laws of
nature). It is an unsympathetic Puri
tan (a Puritan who apparently did ot
oppose capital punishment) who is
supposed to have said, "There but for
the g race of God go I" when he saw a
man being led to the gallows.
The
spirit of that remark is the spirit of
my argument.

But if (55) is thus established, so
is (F5).
For if every human being
has a right to life, and if every, say,
Wellsian Martian has a right to life,
and so on for every species charac
terized by person hood, then every
member of every species generally
characterized by personhood has a
right to life-which is just (F5).

Objection 2. Still, your argument
is a potentiality argument, isn't it?
How else could the relevant class of
creatures be picked out?
And yet
potentiality arguments are notoriously
weak.
No merely potential "A" stu
dent has a right to an "A"; no merely
potential blind person has a right to
an extra deduction on his income tax;
no merely potential benefactor of Mar
quette University has a right to have
his name included on Marquette's
annual list of Friends of the Univer
sity. Mere potential possession of the
qualification for a right, then, is not
sufficient for actual possession of that
right 17 -which is not to deny, it
should be noted, that in at least some
cases of potential possession, prefer
red treatment and / or treatment as if a
right were actually possessed might be
warranted. Secondly, the concept of
potentiality simply isn't strong enough
to do the work you want it to.
The
brain
brai
n damaged and senile, for exam
pIe, may not be even potential per
sons.
I ag ree with you that "mere

III

I

•

I would now like to raise and to
discuss briefly seven objections to my
argument.

Objection 1.
You seem to reject
sympathy as a ground for speciesism,
but I don't see that your argument
differs significantly from a sympathy
based argument.
Aren't you really
arguing that basic rights should be
extended
to
human
non- per$ons,
based on sympathy?
Actually, the
argument is not based on sympathy
but is primarily Kantian-Kantian in
spirit if not letter. The same conclu
sion can be derived, I think, if the
Categorical Imperative, in, say, its
first formulation (which requires us,
human persons, to universalize the
maxims underlying our actions and
policies), were applied to a maxim
which precluded human non-persons
from having a right to life (such as,
'Whenever members of the same spec
ies as myself, subject to the same
laws of nature, biological limitations,
natu ral history, and contingencies of
fortune surrounding personhood, are
not persons, they shall have no basic
rights'), or if we took seriou sly the

potential possession of the qualifica
tions for a right is not sufficient for
actual possession of that right," but I
have to add that the real question in
this context is, What are the actual
qualifications for a right to life? Pro
ponents
of
potentia Iity
a rg uments
think that the potential possession of
personhood is that actual qualification,
and so could agree with your principle
yet obviate you r criticism.
In any case, though, not potential
ity, but, in addition to the points
noted under (1),
two neighboring
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concepts provide some of the needed
backing for my argument.
To use
Thomas Nagel's terms, though perhaps
with slightly different senses than he
does, it is history and possibility, 18
applied in respect to membership in
the species Homo sapiens, which help
to determine the relevant class.
For
it is history and possibility, among
other things, which tell us that the
fetus, the insane, and the senile
aren't utterly different from us-aren't
d iffe rent in th e way th at, say, otte rs
are-and that the fate of our brain
damaged friend could be our fate, or
vice versa.

Objection 3.
On your view, an
irreversibly comatose human being has
a right to life. That's not my intui
tion, not the intuition of many morally
sensitive people, and not the intuition
of a number of philosophers. 19 Are
you asking us to give up our intui
tion?
Probably not-but that may be
because I don't really think that
that's your intuition.
If, however,
after reading what I have to say you
do have, or still have, that intuition,
then I do ask you to change it.
My intuition, and what follows on
my argument, is that the permanently
comatose have a right to life.
But
that is not to say that it would be
best, all things considered, or in the
best interests of an irreversibly coma
tose human, for him/her to remain
alive.
It may well be best, perhaps
for everyone, for that human being to
die.
Life under such circumstances
may be reasonably viewed as undigni
fied, of no value to the human leading
it, and without point or purpose.
Many
end-stage
terminal
cancer
patients are in very much the same
position, except that they are proba
bly in a great deal of pain, and some,
deciding for themselves that it would
be best if they were dead, commit
suicide or request euthanasia.
End
stage cancer patients, though, have a
right to life. The life-situation of the
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permanently comatose seems tome to
be relevantly similar in most important
respects, except,of course, that they
are not conscious, and so a decision
to end life would have to be made by
others-which is not to say that such a
decision (for non-voluntaryeuthana
sia) couldn't be justifiably made.
In
short, if you r i ntu ition is like mi ne, it
is that, given the permanent loss of
dignity, value, and meaning in the
lives of the irreversibly comatose, it
may be better, or at least no worse,
if they were dead.

Objection lj..
don't have the
hands or the musical ability of Arthur
Rubenstein-and
Rubenstei
n-and all
because "cruel
fate" didn't so grace me.
On your
argument doesn't it follow that I have
all the piani
pianistst- rig hts of Rub"enstein?
And since this particular "example is a
random one, aren't you committed to
the view that everyone has every
right that anyone has?
That's a
reductio of your position.
It would
be if I were committed to such a view,
but I don't think I am.
What I
argue,
in
part,
is
that
when
nature-laws of nature and Natural
Contingency-denies a human being the
usual
qualifications
for
possessing
basic
rights,
namely
personhood,
basic morality, perhaps natural law,
makes due restitution for such a fun
damental injustice.
But this is really
restitution, it seems to me, really the
restoring of what is rightly the pos
session of a human being, namely
basic rights.
In other words, basic
rights, unli·ke all other rights (such
as pianist-rights, whatever they may
be), seem to be the natu ra I bi rth rig ht
of humans, at least in the world we
have.
For personhood is species
specific (so far as we know), and
within our species the norm:
its
absence, not its pr~esence, calls for~
special explanation. Not so excellence
as a pianist, pianistic ability, or an
ability or acquire either trait. Hence
talk of basic rights as the natural
birthright of human beings, all of
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them, is appropriate (while of frogs,
none of them, is it so); and hence
talk of pianist rights as the natural
birthright of human beings out of
place.
Put somewhat differently-and
certainly extravagantly-it would be
appropriate to ask the Supreme Court
of, Justice of the Cosmos for adequate
compensation for having been denied
personhood-such a request would be
reasonable, and the only adequate
compensation would be the accordance
of basic rights-but it wou Id not be
appropriate to ask for compensation
for having been denied Rubenstein's
hands and musical ability.
Gifts of
fortune, unlike personhood, are no
one's b i rt h rig h t .

Objection 5. On your view, if one
member of a species happens to attain
personhood-whether a a result of a
freak accident of nature or human
intervention is
irrelevant-then
all
members of that species have a right
to life.
That's cou nteri
nterintuitive,
ntuitive, and
its
counterintuitiveness drives
me
away from your species principle and
back to a purely mentalistic one. Let
me explain.
Suppose that a serum
were developed which, when injected
into a healthy kitten, enabled that
kitten to develop into a feline per
son. 20 If one such kitten did attain
personhood, then alJ members of his
species have a right to life-according
to you. Now, I don't doubt that that
particular cat, the one that's a per
son, has a right to life; but I doubt
that his being a person has anything
to do with whether Tabby, my cat,
has a right to life. Tabby, after all,
ns the same whether or not such
remains
remai
a cat exists, has existed, or will
exist. That, I take it, is a powerful
argument both for rejecting your
species principles and for embracing a
purely mentalistic principle. Actually,
I think that your objection can be
handled in either of two ways. (1) a
speciesist like myself could agree that
the existence of a super-cat does
endow every member ~of the species
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Felis domestica with a right to life,
though that is indeed counterintuitive.
(2) Or, a speciesist could hold that
your super-cat was really a member of
another species, and so not be com
mitted to the view that, should there
be such a super-cat, all members of
the species Felis domestica have a
right to life.
The second alternative
is in fact more plausible for super
cats-given the physiological conditions
necessary for a distinctly personal
mental life, a super-cat would have to
be significantly structurally dissimilar
from normal cats (even if a super-cat
could mate with a normal cat)-but the
first alternative may not be implausi
ble for a species close to personhood,
such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and
whales. 21
Objection 6.
Your view entails
that under certain conditions a mem
ber of one species has a right to life,
while a member of another species who
is otherwise relevantly similar to the
member
of
the
first
species
has-better, may have-no right to life.
Singer's right:
that's discrimination
on the basis of species-speciesism, in
the
more obvious sense of the
term-and every bit as ugly and deplo
rable as discrimination on the basis of
sex-sexism-or discrimination on the
basis or race-racism. As neither sex
ism nor racism is acceptable, neither
is speciesism. 22 Although I admit that
the situation my objector describes
cou Id obtai n, I don It fi nd that "ugly
and deplorable" or even discrimina
tory, given the a rgument of section
II.
And the analogies with sexism
and racism I find weak, since my
a rgument does not apply,
mutatis
mutandis to sex or race. The term
"discrimination" shouldn't be used so
freely or quickly, I think . . . . In
fact, I think it shouldn't be used at
all, in regard to differential treatment
on the basis of species, sexual, or
racial considerations, until the partic
ular moral importance of each (if any)
has been determined on the basis of
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ca refu I individual assessments.

23

Objection
7.
" Compensation, "
"restitution -these terms don't mean
the same thing, yet they seem to be
used by you interchangeably.
More
important, though, is the fact that
these terms make sense and may well
be applicable in certain circumstances
in which
relations
between
moral
agents are concerned.
But, for the
life of me, I can't see how they make
sense, much less are applicable, when
the
relations
involved are
those
between natu re and individual crea
tu res who a ren 't even mora I agents.
It seems to me that you simply per
sonify nature (and certain selected
non- persons) and then demand that
justice be served.
Your procedure,
in short, lacks solid conceptual sense.
The pa rticu la r mea nings of "compensa
tion" and "restitution" aren't sorted
-quite true-but I don't think that
doing so is important for my argu
ment, and I don't think that this is
the place to do so even if it were.
The more important cha rge, as my
critic rightly notes, is that the terms
lack the conceptual backdrop neces
sary for their application.
Here I
appeal to the fact that they and other
terms I use are used metaphorically
by all those who reject (55) and (F5)
and,
in
fact,
by everyone who
employs the concept of a basic right
at all. My aim is to supply an answer
to Feinberg's question of section I;
which means, in other words, that I
try to show that the conditions under
wh ich a creatu re has a rig ht to IHe
are world-bound in a number of ways
that Feinberg and others simply over
look.
I argue that it is not person
hood simpliciter which ensures the
possession of basic rights, but per
sonhood cum its linkage to humanity
and its world-bound constraints and
contingencies.
"Justice,"
"restitu
tion,1I and "compensation" are handy
metaphors,
just as
"accord
basic
rights" is; their crucial role, how11

ever, is only to show why a concern
with personhood alone is not enough,
and to link the factors just noted with
the concept of a right to life. 50 the
anthropomorphism is not inextirpable,
just conven ient a nd vivid.
IV

If the line of argument advanced in
th is paper is' basically sou nd, ph ilo
sophical arguments which in some way
depend upon a rejection of speciesism
of the sort I have been concerned
with are seriously flawed.
It would
seem, prima facie, that discussions of
abortion
would be most seriously
affected, since a number of important
and highly influential papers on abor
tion (which are, in the main, pro
abortion) are predicated on the falsity
of (55) and (FS). And the approach
taken here would also, if sound, help
to vindicate, and perhaps to reins
tate, one of the neglected "human
being" centered treatments of abor
tion. 24
But at least as important to note as
some of the implications of a pro
speciesism position are the caveats
which should be issued with it. What
exactly the possession of basic rights,
either by competent agents, or-and
especially-by incompetent agents, or
by incompetent non-agents, entails in
terms of concrete requi rements for us,
finite and limited in time, ability, and
resources as we are, has certainly not
been discussed here. 25 Neither have
the concepts of a person ora human
being been analyzed or explored, and
they,
too, demand
close scrutiny
before the practical import of specie
sism can be assessed. I n brief, much
more need be said before the true
significance of the positive conclusions
of this
paper can
be accurately
gauged.
But some terrain has been
cleared, I hope, and some groundwork
done, a nd that itself is . not without
worth or importance. 26
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